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1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1862) (urging Congress to give the Court of Claims the power
to issue enforceable final judgments, rather than mere recommendations to be submitted to Congress for
its consideration).
2. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  This prohibition extends to state governments
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause provides, in pertinent part, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due
process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233, 241 (1897), the Supreme
Court first held the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
3. State just compensation provisions are similar to the Federal Just Compensation Clause, except that
many add that “damaging” of private property also will give rise to just compensation.  See, e.g., CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just
compensation . . . has first been paid to . . . the owner.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”).
4. The prohibition also applies to taking by the federal government of property held by state and local
government entities.  United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984).
5. The power of eminent domain, sometimes known as the power of “direct condemnation,” is referred
to as “an attribute of sovereignty.”  Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).  The Court further
explained:
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“[It is] the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself.”
Abraham Lincoln1
I.  INTRODUCTION
Takings doctrine is a mess.  Let’s just accept that and establish specialized federal
and state “takings courts” to adjudicate takings claims. Takings claims arise when
governmental conduct is alleged to detrimentally affect private property.  Adjudication
of takings claims may initially seem straightforward: the Fifth Amendment’s Just
Compensation Clause,2 as well as analogous state constitutional provisions,3 plainly
provide that the government shall not take private4 property for public use without just
compensation.  There are circumstances that clearly fall within such prohibitions.  For
example, if I own a vacant lot that happens to be located in the path of a proposed
freeway, there is no question that the government can use its inherent power of eminent
domain to bring a “direct” condemnation proceeding during which a battle of experts
will determine the amount of compensation I will receive.5
2009] SPECIALIZED "TAKINGS COURTS" 469
The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for public uses,
appertains to every independent government.  It requires no constitutional recognition; it is
an attribute of sovereignty. The [constitutional clauses] . . . providing for just compensation
for property taken [are] . . . mere limitation[s] upon the exercise of the right.
Id.; see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32 (1954); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982) (holding that eminent
domain power is an “inherent attribute of sovereignty” that authorizes the taking of intangible personal
property such as a professional football franchise).
6. See Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1983) (critiquing the relatively flimsy nature of the “public use” limitation).
7. The hope of keeping the lot is also involved in the direct condemnation setting, of course, but is
deemed incorporated into the fair market value paid as just compensation.  See generally Christopher
Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
677 (2005) (examining different valuation mechanisms); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (applying a personhood perspective of property to takings).
This relatively straightforward “direct condemnation” scenario contains certain
classic elements: (1) something we unquestioningly identify as property is plainly
involved—land and all attributes of land ownership; (2) the governmental conduct is,
without doubt, a “taking” for a “public use” because it puts the public in my place with
respect to the land—the vacant lot, formerly mine exclusively, will become a few
hundred feet of freeway surface used by the public for getting places quickly; and (3)
the governmental conduct here can be regarded as a purposeful act of expropriation
where the condemning agency knows both that it is drastically altering my status in
reference to the land and that it therefore would be obligated to compensate me for its
conduct.  This standard case of direct condemnation rarely presents legal problems as
long as certain minimal requirements—fair procedure, a governmental purpose, and
fair compensation—are met.6 
Problems arise, however, in the non-direct condemnation setting, where
governmental conduct varies from the classic direct condemnation script.  Suppose, for
example, that when I purchased the vacant lot it was zoned for apartment buildings.
If the city thereafter rezones the area to allow only single-family residences in order
to reduce traffic congestion, noise, and overall crowded conditions that apartment
buildings bring, then my lost expectation of someday constructing an apartment
building on it is not so obviously a loss of “property.”  In the direct condemnation
situation, a physical, tangible vacant lot is involved, whereas here, only the intangible
hope and the concomitant lost value of using the property for apartments is affected.7
Even if that hope will be treated as “property” by law, it is not so obvious that a
“taking” for “public use” has occurred.  What should the law consider as the “relevant”
property?  Should we focus broadly on all the potential uses of the vacant lot as the
relevant property, or should we focus narrowly on the hoped-for apartment use?  If the
relevant property is broadly defined, then merely one use among many potential uses
has been prohibited, and the relevant property has been merely diminished, not
destroyed.  Such diminution could be treated as a cost of living in a civilized
society—like speed limits—whereby absolute freedom is constrained so that relative
freedom can be preserved.
If we instead define the “relevant property” narrowly, as consisting of the
prospective apartment use, perhaps measured as the difference in value between single-
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8. My work in the takings field includes: JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS (2006) [hereinafter
MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS]; John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting
“Liberty-Property”, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515 (2008); John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential
Theory for Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L.J. 445 (2001)
[hereinafter John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential Theory]; John Martinez & Nick J.
Colessides, Taming the Takings Tiger, 12-Jan UTAH B.J. 7 (1999); John Martinez, A Framework for
Addressing Takings Problems, 9-Jul UTAH B.J. 13 (1996); John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law:
Flying in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); John Martinez, Trees in the Forest: A Reply
to Professor Laitos, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 51 (1993); John Martinez, A Critical
Analysis of the 1987 Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PROP.
L.J. 39 (1988); John Martinez, Reconstructing Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty,
16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 (1988); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional
Right to be Free From “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297 (1988).
Substantial portions of my four-volume treatise on LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW are devoted to the takings
problem.  See 3 C. DALLAS SANDS, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
§§ 16.01-.64 (West 2008) [hereinafter SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW]; see
also JOHN MARTINEZ & MICHAEL E. LIBONATI, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: A TRANSACTIONAL
APPROACH (2000).
9. See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308 (1998)
(“The incoherence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s output in this field has by now been demonstrated time and
again by practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the ongoing
gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly pointless
family and apartment use, it is possible to argue that all of my relevant property has
been affected.  Is it reasonable to say the public has “acquired” my expectation, as in
the direct condemnation scenario, and should therefore pay me?  Or is the extinction
of my expectation for a public purpose—that the public is simply better off with fewer
apartments in the area—and therefore no remedy is due?  But is extinction of such an
expectation, even if for a “public purpose,” sufficient to trigger some sort of remedy?
We have a range of remedial choices: Should I be entitled to have the rezoning
ordinance declared invalid?  Am I entitled to damages?  What measure of damages?
Should I be able to force the city to buy my lot, or at least to pay damages for having
diminished its value from apartment to single-family residential use?
Would awarding compensation to me in any “non-direct condemnation” setting
unduly infringe on the city's authority to commit the public treasury?  In the direct
condemnation setting, the city proceeds with a conscious expectation that it will be
financially obligated to the owner.  With less overt forms of governmental conduct,
such as zoning, the city does not expect to pay for its incursion—if there is indeed
“property” that might be affected by the governmental conduct and if such an incursion
has in fact occurred—and might act otherwise if it were aware of the obligation to
compensate. Adjudication of takings claims in both the direct and non-direct
condemnation settings involves the seemingly straightforward “property-takings-
remedy” inquiry.  One need only determine (1) whether a protectible private property
interest is involved, (2) whether governmental conduct has improperly affected that
interest, and (3) whether the property owner is entitled to a remedy.  But it is
particularly in the non-direct condemnation settings that just compensation
jurisprudence has become especially intractable.8  The formulation of a predictable,
coherent, and generally accepted analytical approach for answering these questions in
non-direct condemnation settings has long eluded both courts and scholars alike.9
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enterprise.”); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically
Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 91 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (criticizing the diminution
in value test).  For classical analyses of takings law see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1977); Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971) (analyzing three types of recurring police power
takings cases); David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts are
Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999) (arguing state and federal courts are responsible for much
of the ambiguity in takings jurisprudence); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (reviewing
ethical foundations for the line between compensable and non-compensable harms); Joseph L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (reviewing the difficulty of distinguishing takings from
regulation); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (“[T]his Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any set formula for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require . . .
[compensation] by the government . . . .”).
11. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (abrogating the test for takings which
considers whether governmental conduct does “not substantially advance a legitimate governmental
objective”).
12. Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 100
(2002) (“But as for a nice clean general statement of how to tell when private property has been taken for
public use by regulation—who knows, after lo these many years?”).
13. Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty: Defining Evolving
Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 280-81 (2008)
(“Although I have discussed uncertainty in a negative context up to this point, arguing that uncertain
property rights boundaries have created unclear expectations and inconsistent notice, a limited amount of
uncertainty is necessary to permit flexibility in the law as public needs change.”).
14. See generally Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2007 UT 75, 171 P.3d 418
(vacating district court decision to hold that a landowner against whom direct condemnation action has
been filed can bring counterclaim or independent action for inverse condemnation).
15. For example, in Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme
Court considered whether the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, as codified in the state’s
government immunity statute, prevailed over the individual state constitutional right to just compensation.
The court explained:
The history of [the cases holding that the Utah Legislature by statute could hold itself
immune from takings claims brought under Utah Constitution article I, section 22] shows
that for a time the Court’s concentration on the doctrine of sovereign immunity caused it to
neglect this constitutional provision, which was designed to protect individual rights.  This
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court confessed that takings analysis is
hopelessly ad hoc.10  Decades later, in 2005, the Court abrogated a test for takings that
it had applied for twenty-five years.11  Some scholars have even resigned themselves
to embracing vagueness as a virtue in takings jurisprudence.12  They concede that
“bounded uncertainty” is the best we can expect.13
Because takings doctrine is in such disarray, it is not surprising that adjudication
of takings claims in state and federal courts is also a sorry sight.  Courts seem to lose
track of even the most basic legal principles when adjudicating takings claims.  For
example, one state trial court concluded that a statutory proceeding initiated by the
state Department of Transportation prevented a landowner from asserting either state
or federal constitutional takings claims.14  It is elementary, of course, that a
constitutional right cannot be abrogated by a statute.15
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elevation of legislation and common law principles over a clear constitutional limitation
strikes at the heart of constitutional government.  The people of Utah established the Utah
Constitution as a limitation on the power of government.  It can hardly be maintained that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, alone among all doctrines, is outside of the limitations
the people established.  
Id. at 634-35.  Additionally, the court provided: 
The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for government and to keep
even the sovereign . . . within its bounds.  Therefore, the legislative power itself must be
exercised within the framework of the constitution.  Accordingly, it has been so long
established and universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory
enactment contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs.
Id. at 635 (quoting Dean v. Rampton, 556 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Utah 1976)).
16. See, e.g., United States v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920) (“In order
that the Government shall be liable it must appear that the officer who has physically taken possession of
the property was duly authorized so to do, either directly by Congress or by the official upon whom
Congress conferred the power.”); State v. The Mill, 809 P.2d 434, 437 (Colo. 1991) (“There can be no
‘inverse condemnation’ . . . where no right exists in the governmental agency to proceed under eminent
domain.”); City of Ashland v. Hoffarth, 733 P.2d 925, 928 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the second
element of an inverse condemnation claim is that the agency alleged to have taken private property must
have the power of eminent domain); see generally 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW, supra note 8, §§ 16.50 n.11, 21.43 n.5 (collecting cases); Jed Michael Silversmith, Takings, Torts
& Turmoil: Reviewing the Authority Requirement of the Just Compensation Clause, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 359 (2001/2002); Matthew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1998).
The most recent origin of this “wrong turn” in takings jurisprudence seems to be the case of United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980), where the issue was whether 25 U.S.C. § 357 authorized the
Municipality of Anchorage to acquire a right-of-way over allotted Indian trust lands by seizure, or whether
the federal statute only authorized local governments to acquire such lands through a formal judicial action
for direct condemnation.  The Court held that the statute did not authorize acquisition of such land by
seizure.  Id. at 258.  Apparently, the real dispute was about the date of valuation: the property would be
valued as of the date of the invasion if acquisition by seizure was authorized, whereas, the property would
be valued during the course of the judicial proceeding—a much later date when the land would likely be
much more valuable—if formal eminent domain direct condemnation was authorized.  See id.  Indeed, the
litigation ultimately was resolved after the Municipality brought a formal condemnation proceeding which
concluded in 1992.  See Law Offices of Vincent Vitale v. Tabbytite, 942 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Alaska 1997)
(discussing subsequent history of the Clarke litigation).
The Clarke Court held that § 357 did not authorize acquisition by seizure.  445 U.S. at 259.  That
is a far cry from the idea that a government agency, or official who lacks the authority of eminent domain,
cannot possibly commit non-direct condemnation takings.
17. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547-48, (2005) (holding that it is the impact on the
owner that matters in a takings claim).
18. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17
(2002) (conflating governmental conduct and the impact on the owner); see generally John Martinez &
Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential Theory, supra note 8, at 453 (pointing out critical distinction between
governmental conduct and the impact of such conduct on an owner).
As another example, some courts insist that if a governmental agency or official
lacks eminent domain authority, then such agency or official cannot be held liable for
a takings claim.16  On the contrary, it is the conduct of the government and its impact
on the owner that matters, not whether the government had the authority to engage in
such conduct.17  Otherwise, governmental defendants could simply harm property
rights, and thereafter claim lack of authority as a defense.
As a third example, courts often have difficulty distinguishing between the govern-
mental conduct involved and the impact on the owner.  Thus, courts often discuss
takings settings as consisting of either “physical” takings or “regulatory” takings.18  In
2009] SPECIALIZED "TAKINGS COURTS" 473
19. See 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 8, § 16.53.40 n.51
(collecting cases illustrating permanent physical occupation takings).
20. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Edwards v. Hallsdale-
Powell Util. Dist. Knox County, Tenn., 115 S.W.3d 461, 467 (Tenn. 2003) (holding that a taking did not
occur when claimants’ homes were flooded with raw sewage on two occasions because the district did not
act purposefully or intentionally); Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 56 P.3d 396, 401 (Or. 2002).
21. The requirement of negligence is particularly prevalent in the flood control improvements setting.
See, e.g., Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 935 P.2d 796, 810 (Cal. 1997) (holding that a
“reasonableness test applies to cases involving public flood control works that cause physical damage to
private property”); see generally Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (2005) (explaining that a plaintiff challenging “a
government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may proceed under one of the
[following] theories . . . —by alleging a ‘physical’ taking, a Lucas-type ‘total regulatory taking,’ a Penn
Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan.”).
22. See Barto Watson, Inc. v. City of Houston, 998 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that
mistake is no defense to a takings claim); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965)
(holding that damage to property caused by a landslide triggered by county road improvements was
compensable under state takings clause); 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,
supra note 8, § 16.53.40 n.5, 10 (collecting cases).
23. For a comprehensive description of the various specialized courts, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377 [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication].
actuality, takings jurisprudence deals, on one side, with government conduct that is
either physical or non-physical (“regulatory,” in that it restricts legal rights to use,
exclude, or transfer), and on the other side, with impact on the owner that is either
physical or non-physical (“regulatory,” in that it has an impact on the legal rights to
use, exclude, or transfer).  Because greater protection to property owners is provided
from governmental conduct that has physical impacts, it is crucial to properly identify
and distinguish those situations.19
Courts are also confused at the very basic level of whether the mens rea of the
governmental agency or official involved matters.  Some courts insist that only
intentional conduct aimed at acquisition of property can amount to a taking.20  Many
courts conclude that at least negligent governmental conduct is required before a taking
can be found, and consequently, that non-negligent behavior by the government that
causes harm to private property owners is not actionable.21  However, takings are strict
liability claims: intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct need not be shown in order
to impose liability.22
But this is not “yet another takings article” seeking to achieve greater certainty and
coherence in the field of takings jurisprudence.  Instead, this Article suggests that we
should start from the assumption that takings law is incoherent, complex, and
intractable, and that we should establish specialized federal and state takings courts for
adjudicating such claims.
Specialized courts have long been a hallmark of American jurisprudence.  We
have specialized courts for many particular areas of law, including family law, small
claims, and landlord-tenant disputes.23  Specialized federal and state takings courts
would be consistent with that tradition of establishing special tribunals for specialized
areas of law.
But we should not simply establish new federal and state takings courts without
a metric for evaluating their success or failure.  Thus, once the need for a new system
for adjudicating takings claims is acknowledged, we should create a critical analytical
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24. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1990); United States v. Causby,
framework to evaluate the ultimate success or failure of such new specialized federal
and state takings courts.
Part I of this Article reviews existing federal and state systems for adjudicating
takings claims.  First, the adjudication of takings claims against the federal government
in the United States Court of Federal Claims and in the federal district courts is
described and critically analyzed.  The adjudication of takings claims against state and
local governments, in federal courts and state courts of general jurisdiction, is then
described and evaluated.  Next, the adjudication of takings claims against state and
local governments in more particularized state courts of claims are considered.  Part
I concludes with a brief mention of state commissions and boards that also resolve
takings claims against state and local governments.
Part II of the Article sets out a critical analytical framework for structuring and
evaluating the ultimate success or failure of specialized federal and state “takings
courts.”
Part III sets out the critical features of a proposed system of specialized federal
and state takings courts and examines each of these features in light of the suggested
critical analytical framework.  The Article proposes that there should be separate
specialized federal and state takings courts with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
over takings claims.  The Article also suggests that takings claimants should be
required to submit notice of the takings claim to the government agency or official
involved in order to secure a final administrative decision and denial of compensation
before such claims are ripe for judicial adjudication.  Finally, the Article proposes that
no jury trial should be available in such specialized federal and state takings courts, but
that special masters, commissioners, or magistrates should be freely utilized for the
compilation of a factual record necessary for a complete adjudication of takings claims
by such courts.
II.   EXISTING SYSTEMS FOR ADJUDICATING TAKINGS CLAIMS
There are four existing systems for adjudicating takings claims in the United
States.  The first system is for the adjudication of takings claims against the federal
government and consists of the United States Court of Federal Claims and federal
district courts.  The second existing system is for adjudication of takings claims against
state and local governments.  It consists of federal district courts and state courts of
general jurisdiction, as well as state courts of claims.  The third existing system is
comprised of state boards and commissions which render typically advisory, non-
binding, or preliminary decisions with respect to takings claims against state and local
governments.  Each of these systems will be critically examined in turn.
A.  Takings Claims Against the United States
1.  In the United States Court of Federal Claims and Federal District Courts—
An Uneasy Division of Labor
A takings claim seeking damages against the United States ordinarily must be
brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims.24  However, the federal district
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328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946); see also Roman v. Velarde, 428 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding that if
federal takings claims arise directly under the Federal Constitution, and exceed $10,000, such claims must
be brought in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2006).  Also known as “Little Tucker Act,” § 1346(a)(2) grants the district
courts original jurisdiction concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims over any: 
civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated
or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort . . .[with the exception of cases] which
are subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
Id.; see also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 540 n.14 (1999) (describing the jurisdiction of federal
district courts under the Little Tucker Act and stating that “[a]ppeals are taken to the Federal Circuit”);
United States v. 255.21 Acres in Anne Arundel County, Md., 722 F. Supp. 235, 238-41 (D. Md. 1989)
(inverse condemnation claim against the federal government exceeding $10,000 may only be heard in the
United States Court of Federal Claims).  For an excellent discussion of the nuanced territory between the
district courts and the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, see 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3657 (3d ed. 1998).
26. See MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 14:1-:11 (addressing sovereign immunity
and takings law—including state, local and federal defendants); MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, supra note 8, at
179-82 (discussing the principle of sovereign immunity under state law); see also Hall v. Utah State Dep’t
of Corr., 24 P.3d 958, 965 (Utah 2001) (“The rationale . . . derives naturally from basic principles of
sovereign immunity.”).  For an extended discussion of the principle of sovereign immunity, see John
Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait: Negative Statutes of Limitation in the Government Tort Liability Setting,
19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 259, 265-84 (2005) [hereinafter Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait].
27. Justice Traynor explained the nature of royal sovereign immunity in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital
District:
Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King of England.  In the
feudal structure the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in his own courts.  The king,
the highest feudal lord, enjoyed the same protection: no court was above him.  Before the
sixteenth century this right of the king was purely personal.  Only out of sixteenth century
metaphysical concepts of the nature of the state did the king’s personal prerogative become
the sovereign immunity of the state.  There is some evidence that the original meaning of
the pre-sixteenth century maxim—that the king can do no wrong—was merely that the king
was not privileged to do wrong.  The immunity operated more as a lack of jurisdiction in the
king’s courts than as a denial of total relief.  There was jurisdiction, however, in the Court
of Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown.
359 P.2d 457, 458-59 n.1 (Cal. 1961) (citations omitted).
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to consider takings claims against the United States
that do not exceed $10,000.25  This has resulted in an uneasy division of labor between
the two types of courts.
a.  Sovereign Immunity as the Starting Point
The concept of sovereign immunity is the starting point for considering systems
for processing of takings claims against the federal government.26  Sovereign immunity
provides that because a sovereign holds all power, no one can hold the sovereign
responsible for his actions.27  Therefore, the concept of sovereign immunity in its pure
form provided that no one could sue the sovereign without the sovereign’s consent.
When governments replaced sovereigns, the concept of absolute governmental
immunity took the place of absolute sovereign immunity and shielded governments
from suit without their consent.  It followed naturally that if a government had given
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28. There are two principal models of government liability statutes.  First, there are “closed-ended”
statutes, which provide that governments are immune unless an exception is provided by common law,
statute or constitutional provision.  States with closed-ended statutes include: Arkansas, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§
4012-4042 (2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8542 (West 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 101-021 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-201 (2008).
Second, there are “open-ended” statutes, which provide that governments are liable unless exempted
by common law, statute, or constitutional provision.  States with open-ended statutes include: Alaska,
Arizona, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming.  See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070
(2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-981(A)(2) (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3 (West 2009); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-31-1 (1997 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-39-105
to 1-39-112 (2008).
Regardless of which model is adopted, the law of each state is unique.  See 3 SANDS, LIBONATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 8, § 27:08 (discussing operation of closed-ended and
open-ended statutes).
29. WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY, PART II,
ORIGIN–DEVELOPMENT–JURISDICTION 1855-1978, at 1 (1978).
30. Id. at 1-2.  Justice Traynor also explained the nature of a “petition of right” in Muskopf:
The method for obtaining legal relief against the crown was the petition of right.  The action
could not be brought in the king's courts because of their lack of jurisdiction to hear claims
against him. The petition of right stated a claim against the king, which was barred only by
his prerogative.  To the petition “there must always be a reply: ‘Let right be done,’” and “it
is clear that the petition had assumed the character of a definite legal remedy against the
Crown.”  There were procedural difficulties with the petition, but alternate remedies existed
in large part.  The main use of the petition of right in the early common law was in real
actions, which then covered a wide field.  The basic principle was that the petition was
proper “whenever the subject could show a legal right to redress.”  The early precedents may
even be read as allowing a petition of right against the king for the torts of his servants.  In
Tobin v. The Queen (1864), 16 C.B.N.S. 309, 111 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 309, however, the
court refused to so read the precedents, and held that the crown was not liable for the torts
of its servants.  This decision arose because of the formalistic and mistaken idea that
concepts of vicarious liability did not apply to the crown.  Under the Crown Proceedings
Act, 1947, however, the crown is today liable for the torts of its servants to the same extent
as private persons.  One other protection was afforded the subject injured by the king's
servants.  Many of the king’s officers were liable for the wrongs committed, and from the
earliest times those officers had to have a sufficient financial standing to make those
remedies against them meaningful.
359 P.2d at 458 n.1 (citations omitted).
31. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1983) (citing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 98 (2d ed. 1973)).
its consent to be sued—usually through a statute defining the circumstances in which
the government waived sovereign immunity28—the government could set any
conditions it pleased on suits against it, and those conditions had to be strictly obeyed.
b.   From “Petitions to a Sovereign” to Takings Petitions to Congress
The American system for processing claims against the government is derived
from the English system.29  The English King could not be sued in the King’s own
courts, but it was possible to obtain relief through a “petition of right” submitted
directly to the King.30
The “petition of right” bears a direct connection to the concept of just compensa-
tion claims against governments in the United States.31  The King’s failure to heed
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32. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
33. COWEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
34. Id. at 2-3 (quoting William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20
ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1968)).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
36. COWEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4-5.
37. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
38. COWEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 20-21.
39. Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
40. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820.
“petitions of right” from the American colonists was one of the grievances that formed
the basis for the Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson set out in the
Declaration that “[i]n every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress
in the most humble terms; Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated
Injury.”32
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Confederation Congress first processed
claims against the federal government.33  But as the workload became too burdensome,
it created a “Board of Treasury” for handling these claims.34  In either setting, the
claims were handled as private bills for relief, not as claims for the enforcement of a
right to compensation.
When the Federal Constitution was adopted on March 4, 1789, Congress simply
shifted responsibility for processing claims against the federal government to the
Treasury Department.  The Treasury Department’s decisions were not final, however,
because the Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”35  The Treasury Department’s
decisions, therefore, had to be approved by Congress for payment.36
c.  The Court of Claims—From Mere Administrative Arm of Congress to a “Court”
The Treasury Department was not a judicial body, and over the years that
characteristic became a concern because claims were being processed more or less
informally rather than through an actual process of adjudication.  Thus, on February
24, 1855, Congress established the Court of Claims.37
Improving upon the operations of the Treasury Department, the Court of Claims
used judicial procedures to adjudicate claims, but the court suffered the same
shortcoming as the Treasury Department: its decisions were not enforceable final
judgments, but instead were mere recommendations to be submitted to Congress for
its consideration.38  Not until March 3, 1866, was finality accorded to Court of Claims
judgments.39
For the first thirty-two years of its existence, the Court of Claims’ subject matter
jurisdiction was limited to those types of cases for which Congress had legislatively
waived sovereign immunity.  For example, the Abandoned and Captured Property Act
of 1863 gave the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims for property seized by
federal government agents during the Civil War.40
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41. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 344 (1879) (holding Congress has not conferred
jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to adjudicate takings claims against the federal government).
42. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 28 of
the United States Code).
43. Id. (codified as and amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006); see also COWEN ET AL., supra note
29, at 45.
44. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of title 28 of the United States Code); see generally Richard H. Seamon, The
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003).
45. The name “United States Court of Federal Claims” was adopted in 1992.  Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
46. Seamon, supra note 44, at 549 n.30.
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006).
48. Carter v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 66, 71-72 (Fed. Cl. 2004); Moden v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl.
275, 280-81 (Fed. Cl. 2004).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006).
50. Id. § 1491.
51. Carter, 62 Fed. Cl. at 72.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006).
53. City of Gettysburg, S.D. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 429, 444 (Fed. Cl. 2005); Chipps v. United
States, 19 Cl. Ct. 201, 203 (Cl. Ct. 1990), aff’d, 915 F.2d 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
d.   The Court of Claims—From Mere Instrument of 
Congress to a Real Judicial Body
The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction under its original 1855 statute and under its
1866 amendment, however, did not include the power to adjudicate takings claims
brought against the federal government under the Federal Just Compensation Clause.41
The next major breakthrough in Court of Claims’ authority came with the Tucker
Act42 in 1887, which expressly included jurisdiction over “claims founded upon the
Constitution of the United States.”43  The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 198244
reorganized and restructured the Court of Claims, which was later renamed the United
States Court of Federal Claims.45  About 10 percent of the cases brought in the Court
of Federal Claims today are takings cases.46
2.  Critical Analysis of System
The United States Court of Federal Claims certainly achieves advantages over the
previous system, which consisted of non-binding administrative determinations by the
Treasury Department or more prosaically, petitions directly to Congress.  However, the
disadvantages of the court inhere in the almost incomprehensible division of authority
between the Court of Federal Claims and the federal district courts with respect to
claims against the United States.
If the claim involved lies in tort, then it (1) is governed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act,47 (2) must be brought in a federal district court, not the Court of Federal Claims,48
and (3) the statute of limitations is two years.49  On the other hand, if the claim
involved is one of takings, then (1) it is governed by the Tucker Act,50 (2) the claim
may be brought in the Court of Federal Claims,51 and (3) the statute of limitations is
six years from the accrual of the claim.52  Such a claim accrues upon the occurrence of
the events necessary to give rise to the alleged liability.53
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54. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)
(quoting Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707, 709 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that a
claim for the loss of fruit trees resulting from the contamination of a spring caused by the combination of
the government’s discharge of water into a nearby lake and unprecedented rainfall was compensable, if at
all, as a tort and not a taking)); see also Moden, 60 Fed. Cl. at 282-90 (applying two-part inquiry from
Ridge Line).
55. United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, 616 F.2d 762, 772 (5th Cir. 1980).
Two factors distinguish a tort claim from a takings claim for the purpose of subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims over takings claims against the
federal government:
First, a property loss compensable as a taking only results when the government
intends to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the “direct,
natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or
consequential injury by the action.”  Second, the nature and magnitude of the
government action must be considered.  Even where the effects of the government
action are predictable, to constitute a taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit
to the government at the expense of the property owner, or at least preempt the
owner[’]s right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time, rather than
merely inflict an injury that reduces its value.54
This distinction between torts and takings does not preclude recovery, but may
result in a party having to seek recovery under a different theory of liability, in a
different court, and within the constraints of a shorter statute of limitations.  The
ultimate result, therefore, is a flabbergasting, confusing, and inefficient system whereby
a litigant may be forced to adjudicate a takings case in two different courts, under two
different theories, and subject to two different statutes of limitation.  One court has
bemoaned this state of affairs, but offered no solution:
[T]hough he may have to appear in two proceedings to obtain the totality of that
compensation . . . . [t]he 5th Amendment, while it guarantees that compensation be
just, does not guarantee that it be meted out in a way more convenient to the
landowner than to the sovereign.55
B.   Takings Claims Against State and Local Governments 
Takings claims against state and local governments may arise under the Federal
Constitution or under state constitutions.  The concept of state sovereign immunity
imposes serious constraints on the availability of either system of courts for adjudica-
tion of claims against states as states.  More fundamentally, however, although federal
claims against local governments ostensibly can be adjudicated in federal district
courts, the reality is that such federal claims can only be adjudicated in state courts.
Additionally, five states have established courts of claims that must also be taken into
account as part of the system for adjudicating takings claims against state and local
governments.  After a discussion of the federal and state courts as fora for adjudication
of takings claims against state and local governments, those state courts of claims will
be described and critically evaluated.
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56. See generally MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 2:2–:20, 2:21–:32.
57. See generally id. § 3:21.
58. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).
59. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (direct action against federal
agents under the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure prohibition).
60. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (holding that a plaintiff who claims property has
been taken can sue directly under the Fifth Amendment).  But see Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action against a state for monetary relief
under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment).  See generally Robert Brauneis, The First
Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52
VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999) (tracing the history of takings claims against state and local governments);
Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067 (2001)
(discussing that a direct action might be available in state courts).
The most recent statement from the United States Supreme Court on the issue of direct actions is
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007), in which the Court held that a private landowner has no private
right of action for damages under Bivens against officials of the Bureau of Land Management in their
personal capacities for harassment and intimidation against the landowner allegedly aimed at extracting an
easement across the landowner's private property.  Id. at 2593.  The Court reasoned, first, that the landowner
had plenty of other claims available, id. at 2598-2600, and second, that the balance of reasons for and
against creating a new cause of action weighed against creating such a new cause of action, id. at 2600-04.
Significantly, the case says nothing about the self-executing character of the Federal Just Compensation
Clause that allows takings claims to be brought directly under the Federal Constitution against the federal
government as an entity.  See also Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16; Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and
State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 601-02 (2006) (“Indeed, text, structure,
and, I would argue, history suggest that the Takings Clause should trump state sovereign immunity.”).
61. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
62. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (“In determining
whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young [applies,] a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into
whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized
as prospective.’”  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)).
1.  Federal and State Courts of General Jurisdiction
a.  Description of System
The substantive sources for takings claims against state or local governments may
derive from federal or state law.  The Federal Constitution’s Just Compensation, Due
Process, Equal Protection, Contracts, and Search and Seizure Clauses provide different
textual sources for takings claims.56
However, federal claims against states as states, are limited by the concept of state
sovereign immunity.57  In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress
did not intend for states to be sued as “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.58  Suits
against states might be possible, however, as “direct actions” based on the Federal
Constitution.59  Two alternative theories may apply.  First, takings claimants may assert
substantive rights arising directly from the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.60  Alternatively, takings claimants may assert
a substantive right to injunctive relief against states under the doctrine of Ex Parte
Young.61  Under that doctrine, claims may be brought against states to enforce federal
constitutional rights so long as no monetary remedy against the state treasury is
sought.62
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63. See generally MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, § 2:9 (describing the distinction
between direct condemnation and non-direct condemnation as the appropriate dichotomy for analysis).
64. See generally 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 8, § 16.51
(discussing the development of state takings doctrines).
65. See generally Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait, supra note 26 (discussing the relationship between
state sovereign immunity doctrine and government liability concepts).
66. See generally MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 2:37-:40 (discussing these
different types of state constitutional takings claims).
67. See generally id. §§ 2:41-:43 (discussing these other state constitutional clauses as bases for takings
claims).
68. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).  See also Levatte v. City of Wichita Falls, 144 S.W.3d 218, 223-24 (Tex.
App. 2004) (state constitutional takings claim must be adjudicated before federal takings claim is ripe);
Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 476-77 (Utah 2003) (federal claim is not ripe until state inverse
condemnation action has been adjudicated).
69. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347-48 (2005)
(adjudication of claim or issues in state court precludes adjudication of same claims or issues in federal
district court).
Takings claims grounded in state law, against state and local governments, are still
evolving.  Two reasons explain this state of affairs.  First, the concept of non-direct
condemnation takings claims in general is a somewhat novel concept in the law.63
Second, state courts and legislatures historically have relied on federal just compensa-
tion doctrine rather than developing their own state takings jurisprudence.64  In
particular, state law takings jurisprudence is still struggling with the relationship
between sovereign immunity law and takings jurisprudence.65  Nevertheless, takings
claims against state or local governments may derive from various state constitutions,
specifically just compensation clauses, damaging clauses, or applied to public use
clauses.66  Other state constitutional clauses that serve as foundations for takings claims
include state open courts and uniform laws clauses.67
b.  Critical Analysis of System
The dual constitutional foundation for takings claims against state and local
governments may at first seem advantageous.  However, its appeal quickly disappears
in light of the troubled history of adjudication of takings claims against state and local
governments, in either state or federal courts.
Federal constitutional claims against states as states are unavailable in either state
or federal courts, for practical purposes, because of state sovereign immunity.  Federal
constitutional claims against local governments in federal courts are unavailable
because of the federal takings ripeness doctrine developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City.68  Under this doctrine, a litigant may not adjudicate a federal
takings claim in federal district court prior to adjudicating a state constitutional takings
claim in state court.  However, once such litigation is completed, the doctrines of issue
and claim preclusion prevent subsequent adjudication of the federal claim in federal
court.69
State constitutional takings claims against states or local governments depend on
rather paltry state takings law.  In some states, litigants must exhaust administrative
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70. See, e.g., Patterson, 67 P.3d at 476-77 (state administrative remedies must be exhausted before
state constitutional takings claim is ripe for judicial review).
71. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not
required for § 1983 claims).
72. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (West 2009).
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.6401-.6475 (West 2000).
74. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW §§ 1-30 (McKinney 2008).
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.01-.51 (West 2009).
76. W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2-1 to -29 (2008).
77. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (West 2009).
78. Id. 505/8.
79. Id. 505/24.
80. 552 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. 1990).
81. Id. at 715. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id.
remedies before being able to adjudicate such claims in state courts.70  By comparison,
exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required with respect to federal
constitutional claims—other than the Williamson County  ripeness doctrine applicable
to federal takings claims—brought in federal court.71
2.  State Courts of Claims
The comparatively few state courts of claims that have been established are
woefully inadequate for the task of adjudicating complex takings claims.  Five states
have claims courts: Illinois,72 Michigan,73 New York,74 Ohio,75 and West Virginia.76
None of these serve useful or effective roles in the processing of takings claims.
a.  Illinois Court of Claims
The Illinois Court of Claims consists of seven judges appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Illinois Senate, one of whom is appointed Chief
Justice.77  Although the court has jurisdiction over claims based in state law, it is
limited to only those claims against the State.78  Awards are not collectible unless the
Illinois General Assembly makes an appropriation for each specific claim.79
In Illinois, the demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
and that of the Circuit Court in takings cases is irretrievably blurred.  For example, in
Patzner v. Baise,80 the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) parked construc-
tion machinery in the parking area in front of the plaintiff’s real estate office
throughout the period of construction of an elevated overpass that directly fronted the
plaintiff's land.81  No part of the plaintiff’s land was directly appropriated for the con-
struction.82  The plaintiff alleged that as a direct result, he was forced to relocate his
business.83  He filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Illinois Circuit Court to
compel IDOT to initiate eminent domain proceedings in order to receive compensation
for the alleged taking or damaging of his property under article I, section 15 of the
Illinois Constitution, which provides for just compensation when property is taken or
damaged.84  The Supreme Court of Illinois held that where property has been
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85. Id. at 716-17.
86. 475 N.E.2d 863 (Ill. 1985).
87. Patzner, 552 N.E.2d at 718.
88. Id. at 717.
89. Id. at 718 (quoting S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State, 444 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. 1982)).
90. Id. (“[W]hen the State will be directly and adversely affected by the judgment, making the State
the real party against whom relief is sought, the suit is against the State.”).
91. Id. at 717-18.
92. Herget, 475 N.E.2d at 864.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 717.  In a subsequent case, Evans v. Brown, the Illinois Court of Appeals adopted the much
broader standard that where a plaintiff alleges that the State has physically intruded onto his land and the
State claims it already owned the land, because “the State is the real party in interest, . . . the Court of
physically taken, a writ of mandamus will lie in the State Circuit Court to compel the
institution of a proceeding in eminent domain, but that where property has only been
“damaged,” the only remedy available is a claim for damages in the State Court of
Claims.85
The Patzner court distinguished Herget National Bank of Pekin v. Kenney,86 in
which the State had flooded the plaintiff’s land, as a situation where land had been
physically taken.87  The court noted that the plaintiff in Patzner did not allege that such
a physical taking had occurred.88  The court further noted that although the requirement
that the plaintiff seek relief in the Court of Claims did not provide the plaintiff with a
jury trial, it was a problem of “the inequities inherent in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity . . . [which] is for the legislature and not this court [to remedy].”89
Ultimately, the court concluded that the suit should have been brought against the
State, and remanded the case.90
The Patzner case illustrates the indistinct line between the jurisdiction of a state’s
court of claims and circuit court in takings cases.  In Patzner, it is arguable that a
physical impact on the plaintiff was involved, albeit only a temporary one.  However,
the plaintiff conceded that there had been no physical taking.  If the plaintiff had
alleged such a physical taking, the case would have been properly brought in the
Circuit Court for mandamus to compel the initiation of an eminent domain
proceeding.91
In Herget, the State had initially flooded the land, then drained the water, and then
proposed to re-flood the land.92  At that juncture, the plaintiff sued for mandamus in
the Circuit Court to stop the re-flooding, or alternatively, to compel initiation of con-
demnation proceedings.93  Thus, Herget also was a “temporary” physical impact case.
The Herget court held that the lawsuit was properly brought in the Circuit Court and
the writ issued.94  
But, even if only permanent or semi-permanent physical impacts such as in Herget
are “takings” that are properly brought in the Circuit Court, there is no rationale for
drawing the line there between the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the Court of
Claims.  More importantly, it means that some “takings” cases (broadly construed) will
be adjudicated in the Circuit Court and some in the Court of Claims, thus leading to
confusion, inefficiency, and ultimately, unfairness.  This is particularly so because no
jury trial is available in the Court of Claims.95
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Claims has exclusive jurisdiction.”  642 N.E.2d 1335, 1339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  This approach overlooks
the threshold question in any takings case, which is the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s property rights:
if there is no property, there can be no taking or damaging.  But that does not solve the jurisdictional puzzle
of what forum should make that threshold determination.
96. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6404(1) (West 2000).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 600.6419(1).
99. Doan v. Kellogg Cmty. Coll., 263 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that counties,
cities, villages, townships, and school districts are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims).
100. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6458 (West 2000).
101. 423 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
102. Id. at 344.
103. Id. at 345.
104. See Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 171 P.3d 418, 422 (Utah 2007) (holding that
a landowner against whom a direct condemnation action has been filed can bring a counterclaim or an
independent action for inverse condemnation).
105. See generally MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, § 3:29 (describing “condemnation-
forcing” strategy).
106. 438 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
b.  Michigan Court of Claims
The Michigan Court of Claims is “created as a function of the circuit court for the
thirtieth judicial circuit.”96  Thus, any judge assigned to this judicial circuit may
exercise the jurisdiction of the State Court of Claims.97  The court has jurisdiction over
claims based in state law against the State,98 but not against local governments.99
Judgments of the Court of Claims are only collectible out of otherwise unencumbered
appropriations of the state agency.100
In Michigan, the dividing line between the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and
the Circuit Court is just as confused as in Illinois.  For example, in Lim v. Michigan
Department of Transportation,101 the plaintiff brought an inverse condemnation action
in the Circuit Court alleging that the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT),
as part of a road-widening project, had relocated a driveway which provided access to
the sole pump island of his gasoline service station.102  The Michigan Court of Appeals
upheld dismissal of the plaintiff’s action on the ground that the Circuit Court only had
subject matter jurisdiction over direct condemnation actions initiated by MDOT to
acquire property, whereas the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over inverse
condemnation claims initiated by a property owner.103
The court’s distinction between actions brought by MDOT, as opposed to actions
brought by plaintiffs claiming inverse condemnation, however, breaks down in the
situation where an action initiated by MDOT gives rise to inverse condemnation
counterclaims seeking recovery for taking or damage in addition to, or different from,
the compensation offered by MDOT in the direct condemnation.104  Conversely, an
inverse condemnation action might be brought in the Court of Claims seeking a
condemnation-forcing remedy.105  In either of those settings, the Lim court’s distinction
between MDOT-initiated and plaintiff-initiated takings claims as a means to draw the
line between Circuit Court jurisdiction and Court of Claims jurisdiction breaks down.
The case of City of Luna Pier v. Lake Erie Landowners,106 highlights the difficulty
with the Lim case reasoning.  In City of Luna Pier, the City entered the defendants’
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land to construct and maintain increased flood control protection in March 1985 and,
shortly thereafter, the City filed a complaint in the Circuit Court seeking judicial
validation of its action.107  In an earlier, unpublished per curiam decision, the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the action was one in inverse condemnation.108  The City
then abandoned its claim and, on remand, the Circuit Court denied the defendants’
motion for attorney fees despite earlier entry of a stipulated judgment against the
City.109  The defendants-landowners appealed, arguing for attorney fees as provided
in the State Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA).110  The City contended
that the UCPA only applied to direct condemnation actions and that the UCPA did not
apply because the Michigan Court of Appeals had already held that this was an inverse
condemnation setting, albeit one commenced by the City.111
In City of Luna Pier, the court of appeals held that the UCPA applied and that the
landowners were entitled to attorney fees because the “plaintiff was an agency seeking
to acquire property pursuant to its powers of eminent domain.”112  The court reconciled
the Lim case on the ground that Lim was an inverse condemnation action brought by
property owners, whereas City of Luna Pier was an action brought by the government
that was also within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.113
The problem with City of Luna Pier is that it placed both direct condemnations
and inverse condemnations brought by the government in the Circuit Court.  Only
inverse condemnation actions brought by a property owner, rather than by the govern-
ment, fall within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
Again, this leads to confusion, inefficiency, and ultimately, unfairness.  It is parti-
cularly egregious because attorney fees are not available to property owners who sue
in the Court of Claims, yet they are available to property owners when the government
sues them for direct condemnation or inverse condemnation in the Circuit Court.
c.  New York Court of Claims
The New York Court of Claims is comprised of judges appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the New York Senate.114  Only claims based in state law
against the State may be filed in that court.115  Furthermore, judgments in the Court of
Claims against the State are payable only out of the State’s fund for satisfying
judgments of that court.116  The New York Supreme Court—the state’s court of general
jurisdiction—first determines whether a taking has occurred, and subsequently the New
York Court of Claims determines damages.
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permits giving rise to takings claims must follow this structure.
For example, in Friedenburg v. New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation,117 regulations by the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) had “virtually eliminated the ability of the petitioner to utilize
waterfront real property.”118  All but a small upland portion of the petitioners’ 2.5 acre
residential lot had been classified as tidal wetlands by the DEC.119  The petitioners
applied for a tideland wetlands permit, which was denied by the DEC.120  The Village
of Southampton followed suit by denying the petitioners’ application for a village
wetlands permit.121
The petitioners sued in the New York Supreme Court for an order directing
issuance of the state wetlands permit, or in the alternative, that the DEC’s action be
held a taking and that DEC be ordered to commence condemnation proceedings.122
The Appellate Division held that—based on the economic impact on the owners, the
character of the governmental action, and the effect on the owners’ reasonable
investment-backed expectations—the petitioners had suffered a taking.123  The court
further concluded, however, that because it had found that a taking had occurred, it
“lack[ed] jurisdiction to entertain the claim for damages as such a determination must
be made in the Court of Claims.”124  The Appellate Division therefore ordered:
Accordingly, if the DEC chooses to acquire the property under the exercise of its
powers of eminent domain, which is its only option other than granting the
petitioners’ permit application . . . , any further proceedings to determine the
compensation to be paid to the petitioner will be conducted in the Court of Claims.125
A more inefficient system for adjudicating takings claims could hardly be
imagined.  The Tidal Wetlands Act expressly provided that suits regarding the denial
of wetland permits could be brought in the New York Supreme Court for a
determination of whether the denial constituted a taking without compensation.126
Friedenburg illustrates that, in practice, a litigant must first obtain a determination in
the New York Supreme Court that a taking has occurred and then re-file in the Court
of Claims for a determination of the compensation due.127
d.  Ohio Court of Claims
The Ohio Court of Claims is comprised of justices of the existing courts, who are
designated as sitting on the Court of Claims either in panels or as a single judge or
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607 N.E.2d at 515.
133. Wilcox, 607 N.E.2d at 516.
134. 376 N.E.2d 1357, 1362 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
135. Id. at 1362.
136. Id. at 1358.
137. Id. at 1358-59.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1358.
justice.128  The court has exclusive jurisdiction over actions based in state law against
the State.129
There appears to be no advantage for litigants to select the Court of Claims for
takings actions in Ohio.  In Wilcox Industries, Inc. v. State,130 the plaintiff claimed that
Ohio Prison Industries was producing items covered by the plaintiff’s patent to a room
partition system, so plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas against the
State for an unlawful taking.131  The Court of Appeals of Ohio held: (1) that the suit
was properly brought in state courts as a takings case, and was not a suit for patent
infringement within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts;132 but (2) that the Court
of Common Pleas had properly dismissed the action because a suit against the State for
a taking of a patent right was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.133
In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held, in Kermetz v. Cook-Johnson Realty
Corp.,134 that one can sue the State in the Court of Common Pleas for mandamus.135
Significantly, the Wilcox decision, issued in 1992, did not cite to Kermetz.  In Kermetz,
a developer was sued in the Court of Common Pleas by a homeowner who claimed
damages suffered from flooding caused by a faulty sewer drainage system installed by
the developer.136  The developer filed a third-party complaint against the State,
claiming the flooding was caused by water flowing from an adjacent state highway.137
The entire case was removed to the Court of Claims, which dismissed the developer’s
third-party complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over claims for appropria-
tion (direct condemnation) on the ground that jurisdiction over such actions was
conferred exclusively on the Court of Common Pleas by the Ohio’s eminent domain
statute.138
In Kermetz, the Court of Appeals of Ohio first noted that the case brought “up for
further discussion and refinement some areas of rather intricate law.”139  The court also
candidly acknowledged: “It may be readily seen that our prior decisions on the subject
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have presented a degree of conflict and resulting confusion.  Therefore, the need is
apparent for clarification, hopefully to be found within this decision.”140  The court
held that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over such “tortious” or “pro tanto” types
of takings (non-direct condemnation), as with any other type of tort action against the
State.141  In the alternative, the court held that the Court of Common Pleas also had
jurisdiction over actions in mandamus to require the State to initiate an appropriation
proceeding (forced direct condemnation remedy) where the property owner could show
the existence of a clear legal duty of the state official to act in the first instance because
the Court of Claims did not provide a remedy in the due course of law because no jury
trial was provided in that forum.142
The upshot is that in Ohio, suits for takings against the State may be brought either
as non-direct condemnation suits in the Court of Claims or for mandamus in the Court
of Common Pleas.143
e.  West Virginia Court of Claims
The West Virginia Court of Claims is comprised of three judges appointed by the
President of the state Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates, with the
advice and consent of the Senate.144  The court has jurisdiction over claims based in
state law against the State, but not against local governments.145  Significantly, the
court may only make recommendations regarding claims which the State “should in
equity in good conscience discharge and pay.”146
The West Virginia Court of Claims is not really a “court” at all, but simply an
agency for processing claims for which appropriations already exist.  Thus, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated that “the court of claims is not a
judicial body, but an entity created by and otherwise accountable only to the Legisla-
ture.”147  Additionally, the court noted that “[t]he awards of the court of claims . . . are
actually recommendations and are not binding on the Legislature.”148
Even though the West Virginia Court of Claims is not really a court, there is
confusion in state law about the manner in which takings claims are to be processed in
the state by “real” courts.  For example, in Shaffer v. West Virginia Department of
Transportation,149 the plaintiff-landowner sued the West Virginia Department of
Transportation (WVDOT) in the State Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus to require
WVDOT to institute eminent domain proceedings in an effort to compensate the
landowner for damages from flooding allegedly caused by the reconstruction of a
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highway by WVDOT.150  The court noted that a mandamus proceeding was the
appropriate form of action.151  The court also noted that the plaintiff in the writ
proceeding need only show “‘that there is reasonable cause to believe’ that the
question of whether”152 the damage to her property resulted from WVDOT’s conduct
“should be resolved by a judge and jury.”153  This is because the proceedings entailed
are twofold: the writ proceeding and the subsequent forced condemnation action.154
This peculiar state of procedure results from two constitutional provisions in West
Virginia: article III, section 9 states that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use, without just compensation,”155 and article VI, section 35
provides that “[t]he State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court
of law or equity.”156  The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
acknowledged that these two provisions “appear to be irreconcilable.”157  Accordingly,
the court developed the following procedural remedy: 
[I]f the State Road Commissioner abuses his discretion in failing to institute an action
of eminent domain against a property owner who alleges that his property has been
taken or damaged as a result of the construction of a public highway, such
commissioner will by this Court be directed in a mandamus proceeding to institute
such action to determine whether property has been taken or damaged and, if so, the
amount of damage the property owner has suffered.158
This, of course, leads to a complex and inefficient two-step process.
C.  State Commissions and Boards That Address Takings Claims
The third existing system for adjudicating takings claims is comprised of state
boards and commissions that render advisory, non-binding, or preliminary decisions
with respect to takings claims against state and local governments.  These decisions
combine three different aspects of takings law: government tort liability, direct
condemnation, and non-direct condemnation.
Twelve states have commissions or boards, although not specifically granted
authority, which may address takings claims through the exercise of normal duties.159
Although such boards may address taking claims, their authority and jurisdiction to
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provide meaningful remedy is limited.  For example, in Alabama, there is a “Board of
Adjustment”160 authorized to satisfy claims against the state “where in law, justice or
good morals the same should be paid.”161  Takings claims may be brought against state
agencies, despite the constitutional provision, “[t]hat . . . the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.”162  However, one of the
elements of an inverse condemnation claim is that the state agency must have the
power of eminent domain.163  As a result, the Board of Adjustment adjudicates virtually
no takings claims in Alabama.
In Arkansas, there is the “Arkansas State Claims Commission.”164 The State
Claims Commission has jurisdiction over claims against state agencies, but lacks juris-
diction over claims against local governments.165  The State Claims Commission has
jurisdiction “only over those claims which are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from being litigated in a court of general jurisdiction.”166  Although state
courts have jurisdiction over takings claims against state167 and local168 governments,
the State Claims Commission lacks jurisdiction over such claims.
California statutes authorize local government bodies to establish claim
“boards.”169  California’s Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board is also
established by state statute.170  Neither of these is authorized to process takings claims.
None of the other states have boards or commissions that possess jurisdiction to
adjudicate takings claims in any meaningful sense.  Only Nebraska has a State Claims
Board that serves a real function in the processing of takings claims.171  Takings
claimants must process their claims through the State Claims Board before such claims
can be adjudicated in a state court.172
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III.  AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRUCTURING IDEAL 
FEDERAL AND STATE “TAKINGS COURTS”
The characteristics of an ideal federal or state “takings court” must be ascertained
in light of a critical analytical framework for evaluating specialized courts. Accord-
ingly, this Article develops such a framework next, and then applies the framework to
sketch out the broad outlines of ideal federal and state “takings courts.”
A.  Specialized Courts in General
Specialized courts may be defined as substance-specific, specialized tribunals.173
From time-to-time, there have been recommendations that more specialized courts
should be established to deal with particular areas of the law.174  And indeed, our
system of jurisprudence includes a substantial number of specialized courts.
A partial list of the specialized courts now operating in the United States includes:
(1) landlord-tenant court, (2) small claims court, (3) traffic court, (4) night court, (5)
family court, also known as “domestic relations court,” (6) the United States Court of
Federal Claims, (7) state courts of claims, (8) probate court, also known as “surrogate’s
court,” (9) labor court in international law, (10) tax court, (11) bankruptcy court, (12)
in New Jersey, “Mount Laurel Judges” specialize in considering whether a city or
county has met its “fair share” requirement of providing low- to moderate-income
housing in the city or county, and (13) in Delaware, a special forum has been created
to resolve corporate governance disputes.175
As observed in these examples, specialized courts tend to be substance-specific.
Accordingly, a specialized court dealing only with the substance of takings law would
fall within the mainstream of specialized courts.  However, the problem is that in order
to determine whether a specialized takings court is successful, one must have a metric
or analytical framework, for critically evaluating specialized courts in general, and
specialized takings courts in particular.
B.  A Critical Analytical Framework for Evaluating Specialized Takings Courts
A critical analytical framework is a tool for determining whether the object under
study fulfills the objectives for which the object was constructed.  Therefore, a critical
analytical framework for evaluating specialized courts should determine whether the
specialized court fulfills the objectives for which the court was established.
One type of critical analytical framework for considering specialized courts
consists of lists of objective and subjective factors.  For example, one set of factors
would include a “court’s docket-clearing rate, or the number of litigants choosing the
492 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2
176. This is the approach taken by Professor Rochelle C. Dreyfuss.  See Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future,
supra note 173, at 11.
177. Id.  
178. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 88-89 (1995).
179. Id.; see also Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329,
330-31 (1991).
180. Stempel, supra note 178, at 89; see also Bruff, supra note 179, at 331-32.
court rather than other tribunals of comparable adjudicatory authority.”176  Subjective
factors would “include the satisfaction that litigants express in the adjudication they
received, the regard with which the court is held among lawyers, academics and judges,
and the degree to which citizens . . . accept the court’s output.”177 
  Another, more robust, type of critical analytical framework consists of a set of
functional criteria whereby one can consider the success or failure of a particular
specialized court.178  Thus, the advantages derived from a specialized court could
include: “improved precision and predictability of adjudication; more accurate
adjudication; more coherent articulation of legal standards; greater expertise of the
bench; economies of scale that flow from division of labor, particularly including
speed, reduced costs and greater efficiency through streamlining of repetitive tasks and
wasted motions.”179
The disadvantages resulting from a specialized court could include a tendency to:
attract lower quality jurists; become isolated and unable to reap the benefits of
“percolation” and “cross-fertilization” that often provide additional information and
current developments in the law to generalist courts; be vulnerable to interest-group
manipulation, particularly in the selection of judges; lack independence since they are
more easily monitored by the legislature and the executive; lack the widespread public
acceptance and perception of fairness that traditionally surround generalist courts;
lack geographic diversity; create difficulties in dividing the spheres of authority
among a mix of generalist and specialized courts; and, make the judicial system less
responsive to changes in the caseload mix of the court system.180
A “list of factors” approach is a good descriptive tool, in that it allows us to
perceive how a court is functioning, but it is not a good analytical tool.  By compari-
son, a functional approach is more robust because it allows us to critically examine the
operations of a court in light of the purposes for which the court was established.
Therefore, the functional approach measures the achievements and operations of the
particular specialized court in comparison to a system of justice without such a court.
A functional approach places particular emphasis on the expertise developed by
a judge sitting on such a court.  That dimension of considering the success or failure
of a specialized court from a functional perspective has been aptly expressed in the
business court setting as follows:
Ultimately, a successful business court depends in each instance on the actual judge
hearing business court cases.  Judges presented daily with a field of law in which to
cultivate their understanding, knowledge, and ability are more likely to come to
deeper understandings about the inner workings of the legal principles they face; the
patterns that may reveal themselves in the conduct of business cases; and the patterns
of thinking and behavior that may appear in parties and counsel.  The judge without
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that experience, faced with business disputes, typically may have to rely upon a less
developed understanding of these factors in rendering decisions.181
Such expertise would lead to “an enriched understanding and a cultivated application
of precedent and growth of the law.”182
In 1996, the American Bar Association (ABA) also came to the conclusion that
a functional approach for evaluating specialized courts was most appropriate.183
Additionally, the ABA addressed the need for specialized business courts in addressing
complex corporate and commercial disputes.184  The same considerations of efficiency,
predictability, experience, and knowledge of substantive law can be used for evaluating
specialized courts that deal with takings claims.185  Several areas of law where
specialized courts are utilized, such as bankruptcy law,186 patent law,187 and family
law,188 have similarly been evaluated using a functional approach.
In summary, therefore, a functional critical analytical framework for evaluating
specialized courts should ask two questions.  First, does the court achieve advantages
over the previous system in terms of: (1) improved precision and predictability of
adjudication; (2) more accurate adjudication; (3) more coherent articulation of legal
standards; (4) greater expertise of the bench; and (5) economies of scale that flow from
divisions of labor, particularly including speed, reduced costs, and greater efficiency
through streamlining of repetitive tasks and wasted motions?  Second, does the court
avoid the disadvantages of a specialized court, such as: (1) attracting lower quality
jurists; (2) becoming isolated and unable to reap the benefits of “percolation” and
“cross-fertilization” that often provide additional information and current develop-
ments in the law to generalist courts; (3) becoming vulnerable to interest-group mani-
pulation, particularly in the selection of judges; (4) lacking independence by being
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convenient to the landowner than to the sovereign.”).
191. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
192. Id. at 337-38.
193. Id. at 346.
overly-controlled by the legislature and the executive; (5) lacking widespread public
acceptance and perception of fairness that traditionally surround generalist courts; (6)
lacking geographic diversity; (7) creating difficulties in dividing the spheres of
authority among a mix of generalist and specialized courts; and (8) making the judicial
system less responsive to changes in the caseload mix of the court system as a whole?
IV.  STRUCTURING IDEAL FEDERAL AND STATE TAKINGS COURTS
Using the metric of the analytical framework, we can begin the process of
structuring ideal federal and state takings courts.
A.  Separate Federal and State Takings Courts
A separate federal court focusing exclusively on federal takings claims against the
United States should be established in the federal court system, and a separate state
court focusing exclusively on state and federal takings claims against state and local
governments should be established in each state court system.
The need for a separate federal takings court is demonstrated, at least partially, by
the seriously fragmented manner in which the United States Court of Federal Claims
and federal district courts share jurisdiction over takings claims brought against the
federal government.  First, claims must be sorted depending upon whether they are tort
claims or takings claims.  As discussed above, the distinction between the two types
of claims is far from predictable.189  Second, the consequence of “guessing wrong” is
that a claimant may unknowingly file in the wrong court, resulting in wasted time and
resources for all concerned.  Third, the existing system unapologetically acknowledges
that a claimant may indeed have to adjudicate two separate lawsuits, one sounding in
tort in a federal district court, and another in takings in the United States Court of
Federal Claims.190
The need for separate state takings courts arises from two sources.  First, after San
Remo Hotel,191 most takings cases against state and local governments will arise in
state courts under state law.  This is because San Remo Hotel established that federal
just compensation claims are not ripe until a claimant has fully adjudicated a state just
compensation claim in state court.192  Furthermore, because San Remo Hotel establish-
ed that both the federal and state claims can be adjudicated simultaneously in the state
forum,193 from a practical standpoint, federal just compensation claims against state
and local governments will undoubtedly be adjudicated in state courts.
2009] SPECIALIZED "TAKINGS COURTS" 495
194. MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, § 4:15 (exhaustion as prerequisite to
adjudication of state constitutional claims).
195. Id. § 5:6 (exhaustion of judicial remedies requirement for state takings claims against state or local
governments).
196. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1051 (Cal. 1994).
197. For an excellent discussion on the dismal failure of the Commerce Court, which only existed from
1910 to 1913, see George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness,
8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238 (1964).  Dix argues that the Commerce Court failed because it lacked two
characteristics, either of which might have preserved it: (1) the court failed to attract the support of any of
the vested interests involved, including the Interstate Commerce Commission, the railroads, or the political
parties; and (2) the court lacked the “judicial insulation” that accompanies public respect for the judiciary,
as it was more or less an add-on to the judicial system.  Id. at 239-40.
198. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
It is . . . important to note that in a republican form of government, and as specified in our
state constitution, the judicial power of the State is vested in this court.  Moreover, judges
must exercise that power only in accord with the law and the facts of the case, without
regard to pressures brought by the other branches of government or special interests of any
kind.  This, too, we have labored to do.  If media reports are accurate of threats by members
of the Legislature to withhold salary increases for all state employees generally, and judicial
salaries in particular, in an effort to force this court to act more quickly or to reach a certain
result, then those making such threats fail to grasp the very core of the separation of powers
doctrine and the value to the people of our state of a truly independent and responsible
judiciary.  Further, the suggestion in the briefing of the State that a decision unfavorable to
the State’s position might result in a negative impact on judicial retirement benefits, among
others, might also be perceived as an unwise effort to appeal to personal interests, an effort
Second, state just compensation law is evolving to require exhaustion of both
administrative194 and judicial195 remedies before state just compensation claims are ripe
for judicial adjudication.  For example, the State of California requires that a takings
claimant asserting a state just compensation claim must first bring an action seeking
a writ of mandamus or mandate in order to ripen the state just compensation clause
claim for judicial adjudication.196
Specialized federal and state takings courts would achieve advantages over the
existing systems by consolidating adjudication of takings claims against the United
States and against state and local governments, in one forum in each system of courts.
Improved precision and predictability, as well as accurate adjudication, would be
achieved through the expertise arising from such specialized courts.  Moreover,
efficiencies would be achieved through more consistent determinations, perhaps
leading to fewer appeals. 
The disadvantages of separate, specialized federal and state takings courts could
be avoided through careful selection procedures to ensure that highly qualified jurists
would be appointed to such courts.  Because takings cases arise in practically unlimited
types of settings, it is highly unlikely that jurists on such specialized takings courts
would become isolated from the mainstream of legal developments.  Since the judges
on such courts would be adjudicating cases involving claims against federal, state, and
local governments, it would be imperative to shield such judges from political
pressures.197  Federal district court judges already enjoy positions that are compara-
tively secure from political pressure because of life tenure and the relative difficulty
and rarity of impeachment.  State takings court judges would have to be similarly
protected.198
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that we reject as disrespectful of our function and therefore of the constitutional
responsibilities of the judicial branch itself.
Utah Pub. Employees Ass’n v. State, 131 P.3d 208, 213 (Utah 2006).
199. For example, the possible claims may be viewed in terms of the following organizational structure:
I.  Federal Defendants
A. Entity Federal Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a.  Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
B. Individual Federal Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
II. State-level Defendants
A. Entity State-level Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
B. Individual State-level Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
III. Local Government-level Defendants
A. Entity Local Government-level Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b.  Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
B.   Exclusive Subject Matter Jurisdiction Limited to Takings Claims
Governmental conduct which gives rise to takings claims may also give rise to
claims under other legal theories.199  For example, physical governmental conduct, such
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b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
B. Individual Local Government-level Defendants
1. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
This organizational structure is derived from MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, supra note 8, at 177 n.143.  For
discussion of additional considerations, such as exhaustion of judicial and administrative remedies and
identification of the proper forum, see MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 3:1-:62.
200. Compare Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1116 (1996) (denying recovery to an owner whose store was damaged by police looking for a criminal
suspect, on grounds that a benefit was conferred and that an emergency existed), with Wegner v. Milwaukee
Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (holding that an owner in similar circumstances was entitled
to compensation).
201. For example, Utah law provides that a municipality’s land use decisions can be challenged as
“arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii) (2008); see also id. § 17-27a-
801(3)(a)(ii) (similar provision applicable to counties).
as when police officers demolish private property while pursuing a fleeing felon, might
give rise to a common law tort claim as well as a constitutional takings claim.200
Similarly, non-physical governmental conduct, such as when an government agency
grants or denies a land development permit, might give rise to a claim for a statutory
petition for review as well as a constitutional takings claim.201
If all such additional claims were adjudicated in the new specialized federal and
state “takings courts,” those courts would quickly grind to a halt.  Moreover, if judges
on such courts were required to adjudicate takings claims as well as all those other
possible claims, then such judges could easily get bogged down spending most of their
time on non-takings claims, and would not develop the expertise on adjudication of
takings claims.
Therefore, the subject matter jurisdiction of specialized federal and state takings
courts should be limited to adjudication of takings claims.  This would avoid the
current problems concerning the proper forum for adjudication of takings claims as
between the United States Court of Federal Claims and federal district courts.
Similarly, this would avoid the current confusion over the relationship between the
subject matter jurisdiction of state courts of claims and state courts of general
jurisdiction over takings claims.
In order to assure that all takings claims are channeled into the specialized federal
and state takings courts, such courts should be granted exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction, limited to takings claims.  Otherwise, the expertise of such courts would
not be utilized to its maximum potential.  Moreover, adjudication of takings claims by
other, non-specialized courts, would risk the same kinds of problems that exist under
the existing systems.
Accordingly, a takings claimant would be given the choice whether to adjudicate
takings claims in the specialized federal and state takings courts, to adjudicate claims
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202. If a claimant chooses one forum and the matter is dismissed other than on the merits, such as for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, then a savings statute may extend the time for re-filing the suit in the
proper court.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2006) (if a federal court dismisses state law-based
supplemental claims, the period of limitations for any such dismissed claims “shall be tolled while the claim
is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed, unless state law provides for a longer tolling
period”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-111(1) (2008).  The Utah provision states: 
If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff
fails in the action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
Id.; see also Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246, 254 (Utah 1988) (holding that plaintiffs’ suit against
government officials in their personal capacities was timely filed as allowed by state savings statute because
it had been filed within one year of dismissal of prior suit brought against government entity that had been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for failure to file a notice of claim).
203. The government’s initial lawsuit might take the form of a direct condemnation action.  See
Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 171 P.3d 418 (Utah 2007) (holding landowner against
whom direct condemnation action has been filed can bring counterclaim or independent action for inverse
condemnation).  Alternatively, the government’s lawsuit may take the form of an inverse condemnation
action.  See City of Luna Pier, 438 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 1989) (holding both direct condemnations and
inverse condemnations brought by the government may be filed in the circuit courts).
204. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 347-48; see generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d. ed. 2002) (explaining the basic terminology of res
judicata).
arising under other theories in non-specialized courts, or to proceed simultaneously in
both courts.  If the claimant is successful in one or the other of such courts, then of
course only one recovery would be available.  If the claimant is unsuccessful in one or
the other of such courts—and the statute of limitations for filing in the alternative court
has not run202—then the claimant should be allowed to proceed to the other court,
albeit only in regard to the claims that could have been litigated in the other court in
the first instance.
As litigation involving takings claims may also be initiated by the government, it
is necessary to coordinate the operation of the specialized federal and state courts of
claims with the federal and state courts of general jurisdiction in regard to those
settings.  These involve situations where the government initiates litigation by bringing
a direct condemnation action in the federal or state court of general jurisdiction and the
property owner seeks to assert a takings claim in response.203  In order to ensure that
takings claimants will have their matter adjudicated by the specialized federal or state
takings courts, and also in order to protect the exclusive jurisdiction of such courts
over those claims, takings claimants should be allowed to remove such lawsuits
initiated by the government to the specialized federal or state takings courts.
However, the choices of fora and theories available to a takings claimant must be
harmonized with the rules of preclusion.  Claim preclusion applies where both cases
involve the same parties or their privies.  Alternatively, issue preclusion applies where
the issue litigated is identical in both actions, although the parties are not.  Such rules
of preclusion are applicable in both state and federal courts.204  If claim preclusion
were strictly applied, a litigant would be forced to join both takings and non-takings
claims in the forum of the first lawsuit.  That would defeat the purpose of having
specialized federal and state takings courts.  Accordingly, a litigant should not be
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205. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
206. Id. at 186.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 188.
209. Id. at 192-94.
210. Id. at 195.
211. MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 4:14-:17, 5:3, 5:8 (examining ripeness
requirements).
212. See, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 472 (Utah 2003) (providing state administrative
remedies must be exhausted before state constitutional takings claim is ripe for judicial review).
213. See MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, § 5:1 (discussing “takings precursor”
requirements).
214. See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1051 (Cal. 1994) (discussing petition for
review and declaratory relief actions required); In re Ward v. Bennett, 592 N.E.2d 787, 790-91 (N.Y. 1992)
(Article 78 proceeding required).
forced to do so, and claim preclusion should not apply to takings and non-takings
claims.
Nevertheless, issue preclusion should apply to takings and non-takings claims.  If
a litigant adjudicates the takings claim first, resolution of all issues actually litigated
in the specialized takings court would be binding on any subsequent litigation in a non-
takings court under non-takings theories.  Conversely, if a litigant proceeds first in a
non-takings court, resolution of all issues actually litigated in the non-takings court
would be binding on any subsequent litigation in a takings court regarding the takings
claims.  This would avoid duplicative and possibly inconsistent determination of the
same issues.
C.  Ripeness Requirements and Notice of Takings Claim
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City,205 the United States Supreme Court held that two distinct ripeness
requirements apply to Federal Just Compensation Clause claims.206  First, the claimant
must obtain a “final” decision from whatever government agency or official can inform
the claimant about how the claimant’s property rights will be affected.207  Thus, the
Court determined that a subdivision developer not only had to submit a development
application, but once that was denied, the developer must also be denied a variance
from the local board of adjustment.208  Significantly, the Court further held that appeals
need not be exhausted, but administrative mechanisms for obtaining a final decision
must be utilized.209  Second, the claimant also must satisfy the “completeness”
requirement, whereby the claimant must also seek and be denied compensation before
a Just Compensation Clause claim would be ripe for judicial review.210  The Court
reasoned that the Just Compensation Clause does not prohibit takings, but does
prohibit takings without payment of just compensation, and therefore, until the
claimant was denied compensation, the Just Compensation Clause claim was not
complete for purposes of judicial resolution.211
For state constitutional just compensation clause claims, the finality requirement
takes the form of a straightforward exhaustion of administrative remedies require-
ment.212  The completeness requirement takes the form of “takings precursor” require-
ments,213 such as the filing of a statutory petition for review.214
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215. For a discussion of the role of notice of claim requirements in the takings claims setting, see
MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 8, § 4:19; Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait, supra note 26;
John Martinez & Karen Martinez, A Prudential Theory, supra note 8.
216. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 n.3 (1992) (holding if claimant’s further
application would be pointless, claimant’s takings claim is ripe); Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 752
P.2d 936, 938-39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing futility exception); MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT
TAKINGS, supra note 8, §§ 4:16, 5:5 (discussing “futility” exception to ripeness requirements).
217. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
218. Id. at 720-21 (finding that there is a right to jury trial for determination of whether claimant has
been deprived of all economically viable use of his property).
219. Id. at 709-10.
220. Id. at 718-19.
221. See UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 10 (providing that “in civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors may find
a verdict . . . [and] a jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded”); Int’l Harvester Credit Corp. v.
The fundamental policy underpinning of both the finality and completeness
requirements is to ensure that courts are not called upon to adjudicate claims that could
have been resolved at an earlier stage by the government agency or official claimed to
have committed a taking.  This policy applies with equal force to specialized federal
and state takings courts.  Accordingly, a takings claimant should be required to submit
notice of a takings claim to the government agency or official involved before resorting
to such courts for judicial adjudication of their alleged takings claim.  A notice of
takings claim would begin the process whereby the government agency or official
involved provides the claimant with a final decision, as well as a denial of compensa-
tion sufficient to make the takings violation complete.  Once the takings claimant
provides the specialized federal or state takings court with evidence of such final
decision and complete takings violation, the takings claim would be ripe for judicial
adjudication.  No additional administrative or judicial “takings precursor” proceedings
are necessary to ripen the takings claim, as the government official would have ample
opportunity to render a final decision and to deny compensation if they are so
inclined.215  Moreover, neither the finality nor completeness requirements would apply
if it would be futile for the takings claimant to ask for a final determination or for
compensation.216
D.  No Jury Trial
It is not altogether clear, either under federal or state just compensation doctrine,
whether Just Compensation Clause claimants are entitled to a jury trial.  Thus, in City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,217 the United States Supreme Court
held that, although there was no statutory right to jury trial under § 1983, the Seventh
Amendment conferred the right to a jury.218  The Court reasoned that because a § 1983
action for regulatory takings, where the plaintiff seeks damages, is analogous to
common-law tort actions to recover damages for governmental interference with
property interests, and is therefore one “at law.”219  In addition, the Court held that
providing jury trials for regulatory takings issues would preserve the substance of the
common law right to recover against the government when the Seventh Amendment
was adopted.220 
Moreover, where state just compensation doctrine is concerned, the question of
whether a takings claimant is entitled to a jury also remains uncertain.221  This is not
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Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418, 419 (Utah 1981) (discussing a “virtually unanimous intention on part of the
framers of the [Utah] Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to trial by jury in civil cases”); Hyatt
v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299, 301 (Utah 1986) (jury trial in civil cases extends only to cases that would have been
cognizable at law at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-101 (2008)
(providing that in actions for the “recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without damages,
or for money claimed due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of
fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered”); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-5-102 (2008) (“All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned in Section
78B-5-103 are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise
provided.”); see also Richards v. Salt Lake City, 161 P. 680 (Utah 1916) (determination of whether road
debris on private lot warrants compensation is for the jury); UTAH R. CIV. P. 38 (“The right to trial by jury
as declared by the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.”).  But see Cornish
Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991) (no right to jury trial for determination of public necessity for
direct condemnation).
222. See generally 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 8, § 16.51
(collecting cases).
223. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 721-22.
surprising, because state just compensation doctrine has been borrowed, in part, from
federal just compensation doctrine.222
In terms of our critical analytical framework, the advantages of the existing system
for adjudicating takings claims in federal and state courts is largely premised on an
understanding of the intricacies of takings doctrine.  In light of the complex and largely
incoherent nature of takings law, as even the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in City of Monterey, the distinction between legal questions and factual
questions is extremely difficult to draw.  Because the City approved the instructions
that were submitted to the jury, the Court held that the case did “not present an
appropriate occasion to define with precision the elements of a temporary regulatory
takings claim.”223  The Court thereby seemed to hold that the jury instructions were not
improper—but not necessarily correct.  That uncertainty arose because of the
incoherent and intractable nature of takings doctrine itself.  Thus, the Court could
neither approve nor disapprove of the jury instructions because such a determination
presupposed, and depended upon, an articulation of the applicable legal doctrine of
takings.
Takings doctrine has become neither more predictable nor understandable in the
interim.  Accordingly, it would seem that adjudication of takings claims, including
purely factual questions, should be left to judges for determination, not juries.
E.  Special Masters, Commissioners, or Magistrates
As takings cases encompass all settings where governmental conduct—whether
physical or nonphysical—has an untoward effect on property, the numbers of takings
cases that can and will arise before specialized federal and state “takings courts” to
adjudicate may be very large in number; thus, it is advisable for the judges on such
courts to utilize the services of special masters, commissioners, or magistrates.  Such
special masters, commissioners, or magistrates could narrow down the legal and factual
issues, make preliminary factual determinations, and perhaps dispose of some of the
substantive workload that is surely to be confronted by specialized takings courts.
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224. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (viewing the
takings problem as one where the search for a solution leads to two opposite poles: bright line rules or “ad
hocery”).
In terms of the critical analytical framework, the use of such special masters,
commissioners, or magistrates would be advantageous over the existing system because
by extension, these officers would become more expert at adjudicating takings cases.
Additionally, the determinations by such officers would be subject to review by judges
on the specialized federal and state takings courts, therefore no significant disadvant-
ages would be generated by such a procedure.
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes that we acknowledge the difficulty and complexity of
takings doctrine, both at the federal and state levels.  For all that appears, bright line
rules in this field are simply not possible.  On the other hand, it is simplistic to believe
that the only other choice is “ad hocery.”224  The middle ground may be the creation
of specialized federal and state takings courts, where perhaps we can achieve just and
fair takings adjudications.
